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Abstract In this work, we present a quantum secret sharing scheme based
on Bell state entanglement and sequential projection measurements. The pro-
tocol verifies the n out of n scheme and supports the aborting of the protocol
in case all the parties do not divulge in their valid measurement outcomes.
The operator-qubit pair forms an integral part of the scheme determining
the classical secret to be shared. The protocol is robust enough to neutral-
ize any eavesdropping on a particular qubit of the dealer. The experimental
demonstration of the scheme is done on IBM-QE cloud platform with back-
ends IBMQ 16 Melbourne and IBMQ QASM SIMULATOR V0.1.547 simulator. The
security analysis performed on the scheme and the comparative analysis sup-
ports our claim of a stringent and an efficient scheme as compared to some
recent quantum and semi-quantum techniques of secret sharing.
Keywords Quantum computing · Quantum Fourier Transform · Quantum
Pauli Operators · Secret sharing
1 Introduction
Nowadays, technology has advanced by leaps and bounds. The world at present
has seen a paradigm shift where technology is not an alternative but a neces-
sity. Ranging from transferring high profile date content across the globe,
making hefty payments, signing important documents, drawing a blueprint of
a city, technology has come to the rescue. Therefore, people do not tend to
keep their secrets in one place. Instead, they try to distribute them among
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many parties. This act of sharing a secret among many parties is known as
secret sharing in the cryptographic parlance. It emerged as a technique to
limit the power of an individual in having sole information about the secret.
The widespread popularity of this technique was due to the seminal work by
Shamir et al. in [1]. This formal idea of sharing information between parties
caught the researchers’ attention, and active research started in this direction.
2 Existing Works
In the last couple of decades, the researchers have gone a step ahead and con-
ceived computations on a quantum computer. The results of this rigorous pur-
suit of exploring an entirely new paradigm are the main motivations behind the
development of breakthrough algorithms like Shor’s algorithm [2], Deutsche
algorithm [3], Grover search algorithm [4], No-cloning [5] and Holevo theo-
rems [6]. The realm of quantum cryptography covers a diverse range of con-
cepts like Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) [7–9], Identification systems [10],
Quantum secure communications [11, 12], Quantum digital signature [13–15].
In this context, quantum secret sharing is considered an important problem
in the area of secure communications.
The work proposed by Hillery et al. [16] provides a foundation for quantum
secret sharing. They relieved the applicability of the entanglement property
of the Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) state to create shares for differ-
ent colluding parties [17]. Their work primarily focused on the right choice of
measurement basis used by the parties for secret reconstruction. The protocol
could also detect intrusion by any malicious party using the properties of the
GHZ state. Later, Karlsson et al. [18] proposed a (m,n) scheme based on the
multi-particle entanglement measurements. One distinct feature of this scheme
was the relaxation that m ≤ n, i.e., even if m parties out of the total n agreed
to collude, the secret would be constructed. One of the highlights of their
scheme was the use of non-orthogonal entangled states to detect an eves drop-
per and prevent the integrity loss of the data. Xiao et al. [19] gave another
refinement of the pioneer schemes by introducing the concept of Quantum
Key Distribution (QKD) to increase the efficiency of the scheme. The work by
Zhang et al. [20] used similar concepts of unitary transforms and multiparty
measurement outcomes to reveal the secret without using entanglement. Guo
et al. [21] implemented a secret sharing scheme independent of the entangled
state by directly encoding the photon of QKD, thereby enhancing computa-
tional efficiency. Some other works have been reported in the literature that
ensures provably secure schemes for quantum secret sharing [22–24]. Experi-
mental quantum sharing was reported by Schmidt et al. in [25]. The scheme
had a back-door eavesdropping strategy, which could lead to data manipula-
tions.
Apart from the earlier described protocols, various schemes made use of
the positioning of the photons and Bell basis measurement. Zhang and Man
in [26] adopted the positioning-based scheme and devised an efficient scheme
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for classical secret sharing. Markham and Sanders [27] used a graph state ap-
proach for devising a (3, 5) sharing scheme. Hsu [28] proposed another novel
idea in this direction, which harnessed the Grover search algorithm for secret
sharing. Fortescue and Gour [29] proposed an amalgamation of classical and
quantum encryption to design a novel perfect quantum secret sharing based
on imperfect ramp sharing. The novelty of this scheme lay in the reducing
the communication cost of secret sharing based on this hybridization. They
discussed the important theoretical aspects of the size of the shares and the
number of participants required to reconstruct the secret. Mitra et al. [30]
proposed a novel idea for a rational quantum secret sharing scheme in which
they gave the theoretical concepts of utility-strategy based on Nash equilib-
rium, which restricts the scenario wherein an individual participant tries to
reconstruct the secret exclusively and does not divulge in its share. A very
recent quantum secret sharing was proposed in [31] harnessed the properties
of a higher-dimensional entangled state that facilitated the dynamic nature of
the number of participants and the number of shares each participant holds
in the scheme.
There are hybrid schemes that are an amalgam of classical and quantum
techniques used in secret sharing. The scheme reported by Yang et al. in [32]
used Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) as the basis for generating the secret
shares. Qin et al. [33] used QFT and generalized Pauli operators to design
the shares for each participant and validated their scheme’s correctness. The
scheme presented by Xiao [34] used QFT, generalized Pauli operator, and
(n + 1) GHZ states to share the secret, requiring every party to do the QFT
for recovering the secret, which could be practically inefficient as the number
of participants increase. Song et al. [35] implemented the QFT, Pauli opera-
tors and C-Not gates for secret sharing of classical information using d-level
quantum states. The scheme lacked some basic features like the recoverability
of the secret and the theoretical aspect of QFT. Mashhadi [36] proposed a
scheme that was primarily based on the Monotone Span Program to generate
an Access structure and generate shares. The quantum part of the schemes
was exclusive to the application of QFT, Pauli operators, and individual mea-
surements of parties. Some of the generic steps in the schemes like [32–36] are
summarized as follows:
1. Generate shares s1, s2, ....sn exclusively by classical schemes like MSP, La-
grange interpolation etc.
2. Initialize a qubit and apply the QFT to get |φ〉 = ∑d−1x=0 |x〉 |0〉 .... |0〉.
3. Apply a C-NOT gate to get |φ′〉 = ∑d−1x=0 |x〉 |x〉 .... |x〉.
4. Apply the Pauli operator Usi,β =
∑d−1
j=0 ω
jβ |j + si〉 〈j| on |φ′〉.
5. Obtain the state:
|A〉 = ∑d−1j1,j2..jn=0 |j1 + s1〉 |j2 + s2〉 .... |j3 + s3〉.
6. Each party applies its own individual measurement to get their shares
(s1, s2, ...., sn) and use it to construct the secret s.
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2.1 Motivations and Novelty
The manifestation of this article is a result of the effort put in to propose a
secure quantum cryptosystem without the use of classical means whose incor-
poration in the scheme would have diluted the whole purpose. Some of the
salient features of the proposed scheme are given as follows:
– The dealer D generates the Einstein Podolsky Rosen (EPR) pair. The state
of EPR pair is known only to its generator, which increases the security of
the protocol, as shown in subsequent sections.
– The operations made by the dealer D on the position of the qubits de-
termines the classical secret to be shared. This secret sharing aspect was
predominantly missing in the earlier schemes, where only the operator de-
termined the secret.
– The operated qubit is disclosed by the D only after successive measure-
ments by the parties.
– The collapsed states after measurement of each party makes any outcome
equally likely, thereby requiring mandatory participation of each one in the
protocol.
– There is a check on the EPR state against any eavesdropping. Therefore,
reconstruction of the secret is not possible if there are any manipulations
by the adversary.
3 Proposed Secret Sharing Protocol
The proposed protocol describes a (3, 3) quantum secret sharing scheme. How-
ever,it can be generalized to a (n, n) scheme, where all the share-holders need
to collude for reconstructing the original secret s. This section is consisting
of design and implementation of protocol along with the secret reconstruction
strategies of the proposed scheme.
3.1 Protocol Design
We utilize the single qubit gates I,Z,Y,X to design our protocol. We con-
sider that the participants in this scheme are P1, P2, P3. Apart from these
participant, we have a dealer D who wishes to share the secret s among these
participants as a sequence of qubits. The dealer D creates a product state with
one of the possible Bell states out of the four states |α+〉 , |α−〉 , |β+〉 , |β−〉. We
assume the hypothesis that the dealer D some time back has already shared
a Bell state
|ψ〉 =
( |0〉1 |0〉2 + |1〉1 |1〉2√
2
)( |0〉3 |0〉4 + |1〉3 |1〉4√
2
)( |0〉5 |0〉6 + |1〉5 |1〉6√
2
)
(1)
with all the three participants. The dealer allocates a pair of qubits to each
participant. Assume that P1 gets qubits 1 and 4, P2 gets qubits 2 and 6, P3
gets qubits 3 and 5. This allocation can be any other combination provided
each party has a share of the other entangled particle. The dealer D has with
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him a set of four unitary operators I,X, iY,Z. Also, associated with each of
these operators, a string of bits given by the following correspondence:
I1 = 00, I4 = 11
X1 = 01,X4 = 10
iY1 = 11, iY4 = 00
Z1 = 10,Z4 = 01 (2)
where, the operator Z1 means that the operator Z is acting on qubit 1, and
similarly Z4 means that Z is acting on qubit 4. The protocol to share the secret
s as binary string of length 8 is shared by repeating the protocol 4 times. For
instance the dealer wants to share s = 55 = 00110111, the dealer will actually
manipulate the state |ψ〉 with the operations (IiYXiY)1.
3.2 Protocol Implementation
The overall implementation of the proposed protocol is carried out in the
following nine steps:
1. The dealer D decides to alter the particles of P1, i.e., (1, 4). It also decides
to operate the X gate on particle 1 thereby resulting in the state as follows:∣∣ψ′〉 = ( |1〉1|0〉2+|0〉1|1〉2√
2
)( |0〉3|0〉4+|1〉3|1〉4√
2
)( |0〉5|0〉6+|1〉5|1〉6√
2
)
(3)
2. The dealer D gives the state |ψ′〉 to P1 who decides to measure his share of
the entangled particles, i.e., (1, 4) in the Bell basis |α+〉14 , |α−〉14 , |β+〉14 , |β−〉14.
The quantum measurement operators involved in P ′1s measurements are as
follows: 〈
α
+
∣∣∣
14
=
1√
2
(
〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I + 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I
)
〈
α
−
∣∣∣
14
=
1√
2
(
〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I− 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I
)
〈
β
+
∣∣∣
14
=
1√
2
(
〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I + 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I
)
〈
β
−
∣∣∣
14
=
1√
2
(
〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I− 〈1| ⊗ I⊗ I⊗ 〈0| ⊗ I⊗ I
)
(4)
Here, P1 measures say for instance the state 〈α+|14, then the resultant
system will collapse into
〈α+|14 |ψ′〉 =
( 〈0|1 〈0|4 + 〈1|1 〈1|4√
2
)[( |1〉1 |0〉2 + |0〉1 |1〉2√
2
)( |0〉3 |0〉4 + |1〉3 |1〉4√
2
)( |0〉5 |0〉6 + |1〉5 |1〉6√
2
)]
(5)
=
1
2
( |1〉2 |0〉3 + |0〉2 |1〉3√
2
)( |0〉5 |0〉6 + |1〉5 |1〉6√
2
)
. (6)
It can be seen from the above expression, the particles 5th and 6th are
unaltered as expected since the measurement effects qubits (1, 40 and (2, 3)
only.
6 Farhan Musanna, Sanjeev Kumar∗
3. The state can be read as |χ〉 = 1
2
|β+〉23 |α+〉56 . The qubits held by P2 and
P3 are (2, 6) and (3, 5), respectively. We rearrange these qubits by swapping
their places. Since they have control of their qubits, therefore swapping is
done to get |χ〉 as
|χ〉 = 1
4
(|1〉2 |0〉6 |0〉3 |0〉5 + |1〉2 |1〉6 |0〉3 |1〉5 + |0〉2 |0〉6 |1〉3 |0〉5 + |0〉2 |1〉6 |1〉3 |1〉5)
(7)
4. Using the Bell representation of two qubits states, the state |χ〉 can be
written as
|χ〉 = 1
4
√
2
[(∣∣∣β+〉
26
−
∣∣∣β−〉
26
)
|0〉3 |0〉5 +
(∣∣∣α+〉
26
−
∣∣∣β−〉
26
)
|0〉3 |1〉5
+
(∣∣∣α+〉
26
+
∣∣∣α−〉
26
)
|1〉3 |0〉5 +
(∣∣∣β+〉
26
+
∣∣∣β−〉
26
)
|1〉3 |1〉5
]
=
1
4
[ ∣∣∣β+〉
26
∣∣∣α+〉
35
−
∣∣∣β−〉
26
∣∣∣α−〉
35
+
∣∣∣α+〉
26
∣∣∣β+〉
35
−
∣∣∣α−〉
26
∣∣∣β−〉
35
]
(8)
5. Since P1 has its disposal on the three other bell basis projective measure-
ment operators 〈α−|14 , 〈β+|14 , and 〈β−|14, the possible outcomes of these
projective measurements collapse the system into the following three pos-
sible cases: 〈
α
−
∣∣∣
14
∣∣ψ′〉 = 1
4
[ ∣∣∣α+〉
26
∣∣∣β−〉
35
−
∣∣∣α−〉
26
∣∣∣β+〉
35
+
∣∣∣β+〉
26
∣∣∣α−〉
35
−
∣∣∣β−〉
26
∣∣∣α+〉
35
]
〈
β
+
∣∣∣
14
∣∣ψ′〉 = 1
4
[ ∣∣∣α+〉
26
∣∣∣α+〉
35
+
∣∣∣α−〉
26
∣∣∣α−〉
35
+
∣∣∣β+〉
26
∣∣∣β+〉
35
+
∣∣∣β−〉
26
∣∣∣β−〉
35
]
〈
β
−
∣∣∣
14
∣∣ψ′〉 = −1
4
[ ∣∣∣α+〉
26
∣∣∣α−〉
35
+
∣∣∣α−〉
26
∣∣∣α+〉
35
+
∣∣∣β+〉
26
∣∣∣β−〉
35
+
∣∣∣β−〉
26
∣∣∣β+〉
35
]
(9)
6. Dealer D can make three other operations I, iY,Z. For each operation, the
respective measurements by P1 and the resultant collapsed state listed in
Table 1.
7. The dealer D announces in public (i) the product state created, (ii) qubit
being transformed, i.e., 1 or 4.
8. The participant P1 announces the Bell basis measurement made on his
qubits 1, 4.
9. The participants P2 and P3 make their respective measurements on qubits
(2, 6) and (3, 5), respectively. Hence, it colludes to find the operation done
by dealer D using Table 1.
In this way, all the three participants hold their shares generated for the secret
s. In the next subsection, we describe the procedure of secret reconstruction
using the shares of these three participants.
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Table 1 Unitary operation and Corresponding Measurement Results
D’s Operation → P1’s Outcome Collapsed State
I
∣∣α+〉
14
1
2
∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣α−〉
14
1
2
∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β+〉
14
1
2
∣∣β+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β−〉
14
1
2
∣∣β−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56
X
∣∣α+〉
14
1
2
∣∣β+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣α−〉
14
−1
2
∣∣β−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β+〉
14
1
2
∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β−〉
14
−1
2
∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56
iY
∣∣α+〉
14
1
2
∣∣β−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣α−〉
14
−1
2
∣∣β+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β+〉
14
1
2
∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β−〉
14
−1
2
∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56
Z
∣∣α+〉
14
1
2
∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣α−〉
14
1
2
∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β+〉
14
1
2
∣∣β−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56∣∣β−〉
14
1
2
∣∣β+〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56
3.3 Secret Reconstruction
The secret is reconstructed by the parties when each ushers in the correct
information. Table 1 gives the exact information of the unitary operation per-
formed by the dealer D. We show the reconstruction result of a particular
case, and a similar strategy can be adapted for other cases.
1. The following information are available in the beginning of the reconstruc-
tion process.
(a) The product state created by the dealer D.
(b) The qubits operated by D. Assume here that these qubits are 1 or 4.
(c) Measurement of the participant P1.
2. Apart from the above information, the participants P2 and P3 announce
their measurements in public, say |β−〉26 and |β+〉35. Then the combined
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Fig. 1 Proposed protocol for quantum secret sharing
state becomes:
|γ〉 =
∣∣∣β−〉
26
∣∣∣β+〉
35
=
(|0〉2 |1〉6 − |1〉2 |0〉6) (|0〉3 |1〉5 + |1〉3 |0〉5)
=
[
|0〉2 |0〉3
(∣∣∣α+〉
56
−
∣∣∣α−〉
56
)
+ |0〉2 |1〉3
(∣∣∣β+〉
56
+
∣∣∣β−〉
56
)
− |1〉2 |0〉3
(∣∣∣β+〉
56
−
∣∣∣β−〉
56
)
− |1〉2 |1〉3
(∣∣∣α+〉
56
+
∣∣∣α−〉
56
)]
=
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
56
−
∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
56
+
∣∣∣β−〉
23
∣∣∣β+〉
56
+
∣∣∣β+〉
23
∣∣∣β−〉
56
(10)
3. Now, since they know that the qubit pair (5, 6) was never tampered with,
hence the state of qubits (5, 6) should be |α+〉56, which corresponds to only
|α−〉23 above in eqn.(10). Hence, the current state of their qubits is
|γ〉 = ∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣α+〉
56
(11)
4. At this step, they use the information about the measurement result of P1,
i.e., |α+〉14. Then, write down the system as
|χ〉 = [(|0〉1 |0〉4 + |1〉1 |1〉4) (|0〉2 |0〉3 − |1〉2 |1〉3)] ∣∣∣α+〉
56
=
[
|0〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |0〉4 − |0〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |0〉4
+ |1〉1 |0〉2 |0〉3 |1〉4 − |1〉1 |1〉2 |1〉3 |1〉4
] ∣∣∣α+〉
56
=
[ ∣∣∣α+〉
12
∣∣∣α−〉
34
+
∣∣∣α−〉
12
∣∣∣α+〉
34
+
∣∣∣β+〉
12
∣∣∣β−〉
34
−
∣∣∣β−〉
12
∣∣∣β+〉
34
] ∣∣∣α+〉
56
(12)
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5. At this point both P2 and P3 make use of the announcement that D made
about the qubit being transformed i.e., 1 and 4. Suppose D altered qubit
1, then they both know that qubits (3, 4) were not affected, i.e., they would
be in state |α+〉34. Using this information and eqn.(12), they deduce that
the state is actually
|χ〉 = ∣∣α−〉
12
∣∣α+〉
34
∣∣α+〉
56
(13)
Now, they make use of the information regarding the state that D created,
which was |a+〉12 |a+〉34 |a+〉56. Comparing this state with equation (13),
they know that the operator acted upon qubit 1 is Z, since,
Z1
∣∣α+〉 = ∣∣α−〉 (14)
Hence, they deduce that transformation Z done by D. According to the
already agreed protocol they share the string ‘10’, since the operator Z1
corresponds to ‘10’ according to equation (2).
4 Experimental Demonstration
The applicability of our secret sharing scheme is essential aspect of proposing
one. To demonstrate the experimental viability of the scheme we test it on
quantum simulator offered by IBM on its cloud server ’IBM-QE (Quantum
Experience) [37]. The simulators are (i)ibmq qasm simulator v0.1.547 with
1024 shots and (ii) ibmq 16 melbourne with 1024 shots. Since the scheme is
based on entanglement and swapping the qubits, we demonstrate the entangle-
ment property between the qubits (1, 4), when (2, 6) and (3, 5) are measured.
1. ibmq qasm simulator v0.1.547: Fig. 2 is the quantum circuit on the ‘qasm
simulator’ with the corresponding states of the 1st and 2nd qubits after
measurement given in Fig. 3, as expected the state of the qubits (1, 4) are
entangled, after each party measures its particles (2, 6) and (3, 5) in the
Bell basis and announces its results. This is ascertained by the nearly equal
probabilities for the states |00〉 and |11〉 for qubits (1, 4).
2. ibmq 16 melbourne: The transpiled circuit on the ibmq 16 melbourne hard-
ware is given in Fig.4. The corresponding measurement results on qubits
(1, 4) are given in Fig. 5. As can be seen from the probabilities in Fig.
5, there are some unwanted states with non-zero probabilities, but ma-
jority are in the state that we should have theoretically. This is due to
noise present and different errors in the C-NOT gates, the read out error
in the actual quantum systems. The error map for the quantum hardware
ibmq 16 melbourne is given in Fig. 6.
The time analysis of each experiment is given in Table 2.
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Fig. 2 Quantum Circuit for 6 qubits entanglement-swapping secret sharing protocol for
operator I1
Fig. 3 Probabilities for the qubits (1, 4)
Table 2 Time complexity analysis of the simulations
Time
Backend Shots Validating Running
ibmq qasm simulator v0.1.547 1024 1.2s 6ms
ibmq 16 melbourne 1024 793ms 10s
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Fig. 4 Quantum Circuit for 6 qubits entanglement-swapping secret sharing protocol for
operator I1
Fig. 5 Probabilities for the state of qubits (1, 4)
5 Security Analysis
The security analysis is an important benchmarks for any quantum secret
sharing algorithm to pass in order to term it as secure and viable. To test
our protocol against this benchmark, we provide proofs for the security of our
protocol in terms of the participation of each party and security against an
eavesdropper.
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Fig. 6 Error map for ibmq 16 melbourne
Theorem 1 The state of each participant is maximally entangled.
Proof : The secrecy of the scheme depends upon many factors, of which the
foremost is the lack of knowledge of each participant of his/her own subsystem.
To find out what each participant sees with his particles in hand is by way of
analyzing the density matrix of their subsystems. Denote the density matrix
of P1 is MP1 . Since the protocol is symmetric in P1, P2, and P3, hence, other
cases are equivalent. The density matrix M for the entire system is
MAll = |ψ〉 〈ψ|
=
1
8
[ (|1〉1 |0〉2 + |0〉1 |1〉2) (|0〉3 |0〉4 + |1〉3 |1〉4) (|0〉5 |0〉6 + |1〉5 |1〉6)
(〈1|1 〈0|2 + 〈0|1 〈1|2) (〈0|3 〈0|4 + 〈1|3 〈1|4) (〈0|5 〈0|6 + 〈1|5 〈1|6)
] (15)
For P1’s subsystem, we calculate
M14 =
∑
a
Trace2356 |a〉MAll 〈a| .
To avoid this tedious calculation, we observe that the Trace effectively becomes
M14 = Tr2356 =
∑
a
〈a| ρ |a〉 (16)
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where 〈a| = 〈0000|, 〈0100|, 〈1000|, 〈1100|, 〈0011|, 〈0111|, 〈1011|, 〈1111|. Hence,
we get
M14 =
|0〉 〈0|+ |1〉 〈0|+ |0〉 〈1|+ |1〉 〈1|
4
=
I⊗ I
4
(17)
Since Tr(M14) = 1, T r(M
2
14) =
1
4
< 1, we have the state of P1’s qubits as
maximally entangled. This means that P1’s chances of measuring any state
|00〉 , |01〉 , |10〉 , |11〉 are 1
4
. Even if P1 used a Bell measurement instead of the
usual computational basis, it would get the same result, for instance
P(
∣∣∣α+〉 = 1
4
〈
α
+
∣∣∣ [( ∣∣α+〉+ ∣∣α−〉√
2
)(〈
α+
∣∣+ 〈α−∣∣√
2
)
+
(∣∣β+〉− ∣∣β−〉√
2
)(〈
β+
∣∣− 〈β−∣∣√
2
)
+
(∣∣β+〉+ ∣∣β−〉√
2
)(〈
β+
∣∣+ 〈β−∣∣√
2
)
+
(∣∣α+〉− ∣∣α−〉√
2
)(〈
α+
∣∣− 〈α−∣∣√
2
)] ∣∣∣α+〉
=
1
4
(18)
Thus, the indication of a maximally mixed state for each of the participants
ensures there is no information leakage occurs before the protocol begins, as
none of them is in a position to guess the other entangled particle.
Theorem 2 D’s announcement of |ψ〉 is imperative for the correct reconstruc-
tion.
Proof : The information announced by D about the product state and the
changed qubit are very crucial in reconstructing the secret. Suppose D shares
the state |ψ〉 = |α−〉12 |α−〉34 |α−〉56 and announces that he shares |φ〉 =∣∣α+〉
12
∣∣α+〉
34
∣∣α+〉
56
between the participants. Suppose he wanted to share the
bit-string ‘00’, so he used the I operator. Suppose P2 measures |β−〉26 and
|β+〉35. They use D’s information about the shared product state |φ〉, to ob-
tain the state of (2, 3) as |α−〉23. They both by the announcement of P1’s
measurement say |β−〉14, deduce that the operation is iY which is the incor-
rect outcome. Hence,
P(Right Operator) = P(Rightly inferred state of (2,3)) · P(Rightly announced state of (1,4))
=
1
16
(19)
Since the protocol shares 4 two-bit strings, therefore the probability of trans-
mitting the correct bit-string is
P(Correct string) =
(
1
16
)4
(20)
We can see that the probability of correct decoding of the bit string tends to
zero as the length of the string increases if the announcement made by D is
incorrect. Thus, the protocol is intricate, dependent on D’s announcement of
the product state shared.
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Theorem 3 D’s announcement of the qubit transformed is imperative for the
correct reconstruction.
Proof : The actual protagonist of the protocol happens to be D since it is D
who initiates the protocol, it has to usher correct information to the collud-
ing parties for the reconstruction of the secret. Suppose instead of the first
qubit, D toggled the fourth qubit and did not announce this information.
Then the situation would be, even if the participants P1, P2, P3 know about
the shared product state they would not be able to reconstruct the secret. For
instance, if P2 measures |β−〉26 and |β+〉35, then upon information provided
by D on the shared state they would come up with the choice of the state be-
ing |α+〉12 |α−〉34 |α+〉56 or |α−〉12 |α+〉34 |α+〉56. At this point, they know the
operator being used, which is the Z operator. But, they will still not be able to
reconstruct the secret message, i.e., whether it is ‘01’ or ‘10’ until and unless D
decides to give in the information about the qubit he toggled. If D announces
that it is the 4th qubit that was toggled, then the parties know that they have
the state |α+〉12 |α−〉34 |α+〉56 and deduce the bit string ‘01’ corresponding to
Z4. Thus they are wrong half the times, thereby Pr(Correct string) =
(
1
2
)4
.
Theorem 4 If P1 lies about his measurement, then the protocol is compro-
mised.
Proof : P1 is a trusted reconstructor of the secret, and his integrity lies with
utmost importance in the reconstruction of the secret bit string. However, there
can be a case where he cheats and does not let his share to the other parties. Let
D use operator Z1 to send ‘10’. As a case of P1’s cheating behaviour consider
P1 measuring |α+〉14 on his qubits, but deliberately cheats and announces as
|α−〉, P2 and P3 collude with their measurements |β−〉26 and |β+〉35 assuming
correct information furnished by D and P1. They deduce the state to be
|A〉 = ∣∣α+〉
12
∣∣α+〉
34
∣∣α+〉
56
=⇒ I1
=⇒ ‘00′
whereas the actual state would have been
|A〉 = ∣∣α−〉
12
∣∣α+〉
34
∣∣α+〉
56
=⇒ Z1
=⇒ ‘10′
Hence, we infer that the announcement of P1’s announcement of his measure-
ment outcome is necessary, failing which, the correct operator and hence the
correct classical secret will not be reconstructed.
Lemma 1 If either one of P1 or P2 lies, then the protocol is compromised.
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Proof : The roles of P2 and P3 are symmetric. Suppose that P2 does not
reveal his measurement outcome, then from Table 1, it is quite evident that
any operator is equally likely. Suppose P3 measures |β−〉26, but P2 does not
disclose his measurement outcome. So in spite of P3, having P1’s measurement
result say |α+〉14, cannot deduce the state of the qubits (2, 3) from eq. (10).
Hence, they will not be able to proceed further with the secret reconstruction.
Theorem 5 The algorithm is secure against Eavesdropper Eve’s forgery at-
tack
Proof Suppose there is a malicious observer Eve who has some ill intentions
about the protocol and seeks to disrupt the protocol. He somehow catches hold
of a qubit that D creates say the 5th qubit and modifies it by applying the X
operator without anybody knowing of this act. So the modified state is
|ψ〉mod =
( |0〉1 |0〉2 + |1〉1 |1〉2√
2
)( |0〉3 |0〉4 + |1〉3 |1〉4√
2
)( |1〉5 |0〉6 + |0〉5 |1〉6√
2
)
P1 measures say |α+〉14 and the state collapses into the state∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣β+〉
56
=
∣∣∣α+〉
35
∣∣∣β+〉
26
+
∣∣∣α−〉
35
∣∣∣β−〉
26
+
∣∣∣β+〉
35
∣∣∣α+〉
26
+
∣∣∣β−〉
35
∣∣∣α−〉
26
P2 and P3 measure |α−〉35 and |β−〉26 respectively. They both collude to form
the secret with the help of the relation∣∣∣α−〉
35
∣∣∣β−〉
26
=
∣∣∣α+〉
23
∣∣∣β+〉
56
+
∣∣∣α−〉
23
∣∣∣β−〉
56
−
∣∣∣β+〉
23
∣∣∣α+〉
56
+
∣∣∣β−〉
23
∣∣∣α−〉
56
They make use of D’s announcement of the product state he created which
was |α+〉12 |α+〉34 |α+〉56, which corresponds to the third term in the above
equation. They use P1’s measurement of |α+〉14 to deduce that the operator
was actually I, thereby nullifying Eve’s attack.
6 Comparative Analysis
This section presents an extensive comparative analysis with the recent devel-
oped quantum secret sharing algorithms.
1. The work proposed in [35] asserts of a secure (t, n) quantum secret sharing
scheme that is based on Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) and Pauli
operators for secret sharing. Their claim for the secret reconstruction seems
to be on spurious grounds, where they apply the IQFT to a single qubit of
an entangled system in isolation for reconstruction. The equation they use
for reconstruction is
Secret = IQFT
(
1√
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω(
∑t
r=1 srk) |k〉1 |k〉2 ... |k〉t
)
(21)
16 Farhan Musanna, Sanjeev Kumar∗
The algorithm applies the IQFT on the first qubit alone to get the secret as
sr which is definitely absurd. Since the actual implementation would give(
1
d
∑d−1
k=0
∑d−1
x=0 ω
(
∑t
r=1 sr+kx) |x〉 |k〉1 |k〉2 ... |k〉t
)
6=
∣∣∣∑tr=1 sr mod d〉 as
claimed. the claim would have been right if the QFT is applied to the
individual 1st qubit in isolation, i.e.,
IQFT
 1
d
d−1∑
k=0
ω
(
∑t
r=1 srk) |k〉1
 = d−1∑
k=0
ω
(
∑t
r=1 srk)
d−1∑
j=0
ω
−jk |j〉 |k〉1 (22)
The protocol thus does not pass the test of reconstruction as claimed,
and can be termed as a compromised one. Whereas our proposed scheme
supports safe and secure transmission of the qubits and facilitates an (n, n)
reconstruction of the desired secret by means of an entangle-measure-
announce scheme adopted by the participants.
2. One of the recent works reported in [36] work on an amalgamation of classi-
cal and quantum secret sharing and at the core utilizes the monotone span
program from the classical secret sharing scheme to generate shares. The
basic drawback in the scheme that we could notice is (i) the secret s < d,
where d is the dimension of the quantum system, whereas our scheme relies
on operators as basic communication sources rather than the secret value
which is implicitly agreed upon by the participants. Secondly, the actual
security lies in the classical sharing scheme and is scarcely related to the
quantum aspect of sharing. As soon as an eves-dropper or even a dishon-
est participant gets hold of the classical scheme, he doesn’t even need to
do the measurement of the qubits to know the secret, without invoking
the basics of quantum secret sharing. Most of the quantum secret sharing
schemes proposed rely upon the Quantum Fourier Transform (QFT) for
secret sharing and secret reconstrcution which includes protocols reported
in [32,33]. Most of the quantum secret sharing schemes rely upon the Quan-
tum Fourier Transform (QFT) for secret sharing and secret reconstruction,
which includes protocols reported in [32,33].
3. The work reported in [38] is a more quantum scheme than the others in
the sense that it realizes the Bell state measurement for the secret recon-
struction and verification. The major hindrance to the applicability of the
scheme we inferred is again the strict assumption that the secret s < d.
7 Application
The security of digital images is a key challenge faced by many big data analyt-
ics companies and multinationals. The digital image may be of varied impor-
tance ranging from military maps to digital signatures. The proposed method
can provide perfect visual secret sharing by harnessing the Novel Enhanced
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Quantum Representation (NEQR) [40]. The image is represented by
|A〉 = 1
2n
2n−1∑
i=0
2n−1∑
j=0
|C(i, j)〉 ⊗ |i〉|j〉
=
1
2n
2n−1∑
i=0
2n−1∑
j=0
|C0(i, j)C1(i, j)...Cq−1(i, j)〉 ⊗ |i〉|j〉
(23)
where, Cx(i, j) ∈ {0, 1} ∀i, j, x. For a gray level image C(i, j) ∈ {0, 1, .....255},
we have q = 8. Hence, in the NEQR model, to represent a q bit depth image
of size of size 2n × 2n, we need a total of q + 2n qubits. Compactly, it can be
written as
|A〉 = 1
2n
2n−1∑
i=0
2n−1∑
j=0
q−1⊗
x=0
|Cx(i, j)〉 ⊗ |ij〉 (24)
1. To set the value of each pixel in the Quantum states by defining an operator
U˜ , as follows :
U˜xy = I ⊗
2n−1∑
i=0
2n−1∑
j=0
ij 6=xy
|ij〉〈ij|+ S˜etxy ⊗ |xy〉〈xy| (25)
where, S˜etxy|0q〉 7→ |0⊕
q−1⊗
u=0
A˜u(x, y)〉 =
q−1⊗
u=0
|0⊕A˜u(x, y)〉, where A˜u(x, y) ∈
{0, 1}∀u, x, y.
2. Applying U˜xy on |Φ2〉 we set the pixel intensity for each coordinate (x, y)
by the equation
U˜xy |Φ2〉 = U˜xy
2
n−1∑
i=0
2n−1∑
j=0
ij 6=xy
|0〉q ⊗ |ij〉+ |0〉q ⊗ |xy〉

=
2n−1∑
i=0
2n−1∑
j=0
ij 6=xy
|0〉q ⊗ |ij〉+ A˜(x, y)⊗ |xy〉
(26)
3. The operation of U˜xy on the state |Φ2〉 sets the value of a single pixel.
Therefore,the application of the operator is to be done 23l times to set the
value for each pixel. Hence, we define an operator U
U˜ =
2n−1∏
i=0
2n−1∏
j=0
U˜ij
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which acts on the state |Φ2〉 to set all the values of the image and obtain
the final state |Φ3〉.
|Φ3〉 = U˜ |Φ2〉 =
2n−1∏
i=0
2n−1∏
j=0
U˜ij
∣∣∣A˜2〉
|Φ3〉 = 1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
2n−1∑
y=0
|A˜0(x, y)...A˜q−1(x, y)〉 ⊗ |xy〉
=
1
2n
2n−1∑
x=0
2n−1∑
j=0
|A˜(x, y)〉 ⊗ |xy〉
where, x = |x0x1....xn−1〉, y = |y0, y1, ....yn−1〉 and A˜t(x, y) ∈ {0, 1} ∀x, y, t.
Example 1. The dealer D wishes to share the pixel at (1, 1) with intensity
55, so he decides to share the state |110111〉 |01〉 |01〉. The state |110111〉 =
iY1X1I4, |01〉 = Z4orX1.
8 Conclusion
The novelty of the proposed scheme is based on the reliance of pure quantum
mechanical properties of photons as compared to a layer of classical cryptog-
raphy implemented in other schemes. The security of the scheme against an
adversary is quite substantial, and also malicious alterations to the secret is
not possible. The scheme stands the test of various scenarios of data manipu-
lations and partial information availability. The applicability of the proposed
scheme for visual secret sharing is given that enhances the viability of the
scheme. The prospects for the scheme are its generalization for security pur-
poses using the GHZ and W state to devise a secure quantum secret sharing
algorithm. The limitation that we find in our scheme is the cascading effect
of the errors involved during the transmission of the quantum secret over long
distances and noisy channels. We adhere to improve this concern by various
quantum error mitigation techniques.
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